Where Do Arab States Stand on Artificial Intelligence?

When the question of the Arab states' position in the race for artificial intelligence is posed, minds often turn to the volume of investments, the number of data centers, and language models. However, these indicators, despite their importance, do not reveal the full picture.

Artificial intelligence is no longer merely a technical project; it has become a legal and sovereign issue that redraws the boundaries of authority and reallocates responsibilities among legislators, administrations, the judiciary, and the private sector.

Therefore, the real question is no longer: Who owns artificial intelligence? But rather: Who owns the rules that govern it?

Many states have realized that leadership is not achieved solely through owning technology, but by building an integrated governance system, developing legislation, and establishing frameworks for accountability, thereby ensuring the responsible and sustainable deployment of artificial intelligence.

In the Arab world, the picture is more varied. Some states have succeeded in integrating artificial intelligence into their national visions, linking it to digital transformation, capacity building, and the development of public services. These steps reflect a growing awareness that the economy of the future will be built on knowledge as much as it is based on resources.

Nevertheless, the most crucial question remains: Are we building an economy that *uses* artificial intelligence, or a state that possesses the capacity to *govern* it?

The difference between the two is fundamental. A state that merely uses technology remains an advanced consumer, while a state that establishes the rules governing it becomes a partner in shaping the future.

Hence, there is a need to address a gap that persists in many Arab environments; discussions often focus on applications, while attention to the legal framework that will define responsibility, data protection, intellectual property rights, algorithmic transparency, and individual safeguards against automated decisions diminishes.

More critically, there is the belief that legislation can be imported just like technology. However, law is a product of its environment, and it only achieves effectiveness if it originates from a state's unique reality, needs, and institutions.

Therefore, building the legal environment for artificial intelligence does not merely begin with enacting new laws, but with formulating a legislative philosophy that considers AI a matter of legal sovereignty, not merely a means to increase production.

The states that will lead in the coming decade are not necessarily those that possess the most technology, but rather those most capable of striking a balance between innovation and rights protection, and between rapid development and the entrenchment of legitimacy.

The Arab world still has a genuine opportunity to contribute to building a balanced legal model for AI governance, one that benefits from international experiences without losing its legal and institutional particularity.

The question that should occupy decision-makers and researchers remains:

Do we want to be a market for artificial intelligence, or a school in its governance?